Indiana Law Journal
Volume 16

Issue 5

Article 1

6-1941

Litigation Problems Under the Social Security Act
Jack B. Tate
Federal Security Agency

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Legislation Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tate, Jack B. (1941) "Litigation Problems Under the Social Security Act," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 16 : Iss.
5 , Article 1.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol16/iss5/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

INDIANA
LAW JOURNAL
Volume XVI

June, 1941

Number 5

LITIGATION PROBLEMS UNDER THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
Introduction
JACK B. TATE*

The keen interest of the practicing lawyer at the present time in the machinery of administrative procedure requires no emphasis. Bar associations up and down the land
are offering to their members lectures and round tables devoted to the functioning of the administrative process. Periodicals emanating from bar association and law school
alike are filled with articles describing various phases of
this process. The lawyer, who never before has practiced
anywhere but in the county court, suddenly finds that his
case has taken him into a State or Federal administrative
tribunal.
This lawyer, trained exclusively in the common law trial
technique, is often pleasantly surprised by the orderly character of the procedure utilized in the administrative forum.
Instead of the dictatorial Star Chamber proceeding which
some uninformed laymen imagine, he usually finds the administrative hearing to be characterized by dignity, intelligence, and fairness to all parties concerned. There is no
more place in the administrative law system for the arbitrary and capricious administrative officer than there is in
the judicial system for the arbitrary and capricious judge.
It is of course true that the rules of administrative procedure differ in operation from those employed in the con* General Counsel, Federal Security Agency.
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duct of a jury trial. Rules governing the admission of evidence, for example, are not so strict when the evidence is
to be weighed, not by twelve laymen, but by an administrative officer, skilled by experience in the very field where
the decision lies. Because these rules are different, however,
is no reason for supposing that they are less effective in
dispensing justice. No one contends, for instance, that the
chancellor should be bound by the same procedure in appointing a receiver as is the common law judge in deciding
a negligence case. Obviously, a different procedure may be
required to determine eligibility for an old age pension than
to fix the liability of a tenant under a lease.
How then should the worth of the administrative process
as an instrument of justice be measured? Is not the answer
to this question found in determining how effectively it is
performing the function with which it is charged by law?
This function may or may not be the decision of controversies
between private litigants or between a litigant and his government. Frequently the "controversy" angle is wholly lacking. Therefore, it is meaningless to attempt to evaluate
the administrative process by the same standards as are
used in measuring the efficacy of the judicial process. New
standards, predicated on the purpose sought to be accomplished by the administrative process, are needed before
any sound judgment of its worth is possible.
A fertile field for studying the administrative process
is that encompassed by the procedure established for adjudiciating claims under the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance provisions of the Social Security Act. This procedure
is peculiarly applicable in that it illustrates an administrative adjudication wherein the controversial element is absent. It is illustrative also of an orderly procedure which
begins by the filing of a claim with the Bureau of Old Age
and Survivors Insurance of the Social Security Board and
which may subsequently involve an administrative appeal,
an administrative hearing, a review by an administrative
tribunal and even a determination by the Federal Courts,
in case the 'applicant is dissatisfied with the ruling which
the administrative tribunal has made. The practicing lawyer will find this process described in detail in the article
by Messrs. Harper and Niezer, entitled "Appeals Procedure
Under Old Age and Survivors Insurance."
Some of the
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problems of court review are covered in the article by Mr.
Margolies, entitled "Judicial Review of Public Assistance
Determinations."
While any study of administrative law naturally emphasizes procedure, it should be remembered that a considerable body of substantive law has grown up since January, 1937, when the Federal old age insurance title of the
Social Security Act first became operative. The origin and
development of the fundamental substantive principles are
discussed in the article by Mr. Peter Seitz, entitled "Some
Aspects of Coverage of the Social Security Act: What is
'Employment'." The application of these principles by the
Social Security Board, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and
the Railroad Retirement Board are treated in the series of
notes and comments which close this issue of the Journal.

